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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Erick Virgil Hall ("Hall") appeals, with permission from the 
Idaho Supreme Court, from two of the district court's interlocutory orders, including (I) 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioner's Supplemental Motion for 
Discovery and (2) Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Juror Contact. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2004, Hall was found guilty by a jury of the first-degree murder, first-degree 
kidnapping and rape ofLynn Henneman ("Lynn"). (R., pp.581-83.) That same jury also 
found four statutory aggravating factors and concluded, when weighed against each 
statutory aggravatoring factor individually, all of the mitigating circumstances were not 
sufficiently compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. (R., pp.609-12.) 
Hall was sentenced to death for Lynn's first-degree murder; consecutive unified fixed life 
sentences were imposed for first-degree kidnapping and rape. (R., pp.661-63.) 
Judgments were filed January 19,2005. (Id.) A Notice of Appeal was filed January 21, 
2005 (R., pp.685-88), and the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") was appointed 
to represent Hall on appeal and during post-conviction proceedings (R., pp.689-91). 
Hall's initial Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed March 1, 2005. 
(UPCPA, R., pp.9-34.) On January 5, 2006, Hall filed his initial thirty-one page Motion 
for Discovery containing over 330 separate requests, two appendices and a supporting 
brief (UP CPA, R., pp.78-109A, exhibits 1 and 2), which included a request to depose 
"[all] members of the defense team and their agents," including investigator Glenn Elam 
("Elam") (UPCPA, R., p.lOl). At a hearing, Hall conceded it "would be fruitful" to 
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amend his petition "so that we can, if possible, tie our specific requests to claims that 
thereafter would be raised." (UPCPA, Tr., 2-6-06, pp.64-65.) The Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief was filed April 17,2006. (UPCPA, R., pp.l55-363.) 
Hall also filed a motion to issue subpoenas (UPCPA, R., pp.l42-53), requesting 
he be permitted to depose his two trial attorneys, Amil Myshin ("Myshin") and D.C. Carr 
("Carr"), Elam and the mitigation specialist, Rosanne Dapsauski ("Dapsauski"), based 
upon the need "to identify additional claims for post-conviction relief whether such 
claims involve the ineffective assistance of counselor judicial, juror, or prosecutorial 
misconduct" (id., p.146). Without objection from the state (UPCPA, Tr., 7-5-06, pp.156-
82), the district court granted Hall's motion to depose his two trial attorneys, but denied 
the motion without prejudice as to Elam and Dapsauski (UPCPA, R., pp.520-21). 
Hall conceded some of his initial discovery requests were not "specifically" 
related to claims in his Amended Petition (UPCPA, exhibit 10, pp.3-4, 13, 16-18), but 
renewed his request to depose Elam (id., p.20), even though Hall conceded Elam was 
being "cooperative with [Hall's] investigator" (UPCPA, Tr., 1-16-07, p.31). Despite the 
state's suggestion that Elam simply complete an affidavit, Hall contended, "I think 
deposing Mr. Elam is critical to answering the question: What did trial counsel know." 
(Id., p.34.) Recognizing Elam was cooperating with Hall's investigation, the district 
court denied the request to depose Elam, concluding, "He has been cooperative. I think it 
is simply urmecessary to depose him. It would likely result in substantial additional 
delay, and there are alternatives to it." (Id., p.35.) The vast majority of Hall's remaining 
discovery requests were granted. (UPCPA, R., pp.864-87.) 
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Hall filed a Sealed Supplemental Motion for Discovery, which included a request 
for the depositions of Jay Rosenthal, Detective Daniel Hess, and Roger Bourne and/or 
Greg Bower. (UP CPA, confidential exhibit 2, pp.9-11.) The motion further renewed 
Hall's request to depose Elam "to fill the gaps in the testimony of trial counsel regarding 
the scope of their guilt and sentencing phase investigations" because, while Elam had 
been interviewed by the SAPD resulting in "relevant information for a final amended 
petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Elam has refused to sign an affidavit without 
express consent from former lead trial counsel, Amil Myshin," who had not responded to 
requests for consent. (ld., p.9.) The district court denied Hall's motion, concluding he 
failed to meet his burden of establishing the depositions "are necessary to protect the 
substantial rights of the petitioner." (UP CPA, R., pp.l 044-46.) 
While Hall's discovery motions were being litigated, an informal telephone 
conference was held January 6, 2006, regarding the release of juror questionnaire forms 
(UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, pp.13-14), during which the district court expressed "strong views 
about access to jurors, frankly and said that there would not be any unless and until 
counsel came back with a specific motion" (id., p.15). While no oral or written orders 
were entered (UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, p.13), it was clear the court did not want Hall's 
attorneys contacting jurors "without coming back with a specific motion" (id., p.1S). On 
January 20, 2006, Hall filed a motion and supporting brief (UPCPA, R., pp.112-14, 
exhibit 3, pp.5-S), contending "juror interviews are critical to uncovering and 
investigating juror misconduct claims, and denying counsel the ability to so investigate 
violates Petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution" (UPCPA, exhibit 3, p.6). Examining 
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Hall's motion, the court discussed its concerns that jurors would be threatened, 
intimidated and harassed, and while not denying his motion, explained, "you need prior 
express permission from the Court." (UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, pp.l5-16, 40-42, 44.) 
On June 1, 2007, Hall filed a Motion for Juror Contact with a supporting brief 
asking to interview the jury and alternative jurors, incorporating not only the bases 
articulated in his prior motion, but the First Amendment. (UPCPA, R., pp.961-63; 
exhibit 12.) Hall's supporting memorandum also included questions he "anticipated" 
asking jurors, which included the following general categories: (1) knowledge of 
undisclosed witnesses; (2) awareness of Hall's shackles; (3) undisclosed information 
during voir dire or in juror questionnaires; (4) juror experimentation, crime scene visits, 
or consideration of other extra record evidence; (5) extraneous influences or evidence; (6) 
extrinsic evidence found in reference materials; (7) religious sources or influences; (8) 
media exposure and exposure to the Hanlon case; (9) premature jury deliberations; (l0) 
juror bias regarding Hall's dangerousness; and (ll) improper consideration of the 
exercise of constitutional rights. (UPCPA, exhibit 12, pp.l3-18.) The memorandum also 
included questions that would be asked to specific jurors. (Id., pp.18-28.) 
At an initial hearing, prior to its written response being filed, the state agreed to 
limited juror contact, proposing, "there can be some juror contact I think," which would 
be "in some kind of a hearing so that the process of talking to jurors who agree to this 
would occur in the courtroom before this Court." (UPCPA, Tr., 6-16-07, p.20.) The state 
further proposed the district court send the jurors a letter "notifying them of this 
information, rather than it come[ing] from the State or the defense, and that there be a 
hearing, if any agree to that." (Id., p.21.) Although not ruling on Hall's motion, the court 
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noted its concern regarding the need to "treat with courtesy and respect and provide 
reasonable privacy for jurors" or "we are not going to have any jurors willing to serve, 
period, in difficult cases." (Id., p.25.) 
The state addressed all of Hall's anticipated questions, objecting to "unrestricted 
access to the jurors," suggesting any questioning "should only be done in the Court's 
presence so the Court can enforce its order restricting the questions." (UPCPA, R., 
pp.968-84.) Addressing the state's concession that any questioning could be done in the 
district court's presence, Hall responded, "we strongly feel should be rejected by the 
Court. There are so many psychological reasons for not doing that. And there's no 
support in law. Again, there's nothing prohibiting us from contacting these people." 
(UPCPA, Tr., 8-8-07, p.121.) After reviewing each of Hall's proposed questions, the 
district court denied his motion. (Id., pp.123-45.) In its written order filed September 17, 
2007, the court concluded the motion was "part of discovery," the claims "relating to 
possible jury misconduct are made without factual support" and I.R.E. 606(b) "serves to 
protect jurors from 'post trial inquiry or harassment. '" (UPCP A, R, pp.l 020-24.) 
On August 23,2007, Hall filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, asking that he 
be permitted to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's orders 
prohibiting juror contact and taking Elam's deposition. (UPCPA, R, pp.996-1006.) The 
district court denied Hall's motion. (UPCPA, R, pp.1527-28.) On February 22, 2008, 
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting Hall's motion for an interlocutory 
appeal on "discretionary decisions: I. Contact with jurors; and 2. Deposition of 
Investigator, Glenn Elam." (UPCPA, R., pp.1570-71.) Pursuant to the supreme court's 
order, Hall filed a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2008. (Id., pp.1565-69.) 
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ISSUES 
Hall has phrased the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the district court's order forbidding any communications 
with jurors unless Mr. Hall can first demonstrate that such 
communications are necessary to protect his substantial rights, 
violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution? [sic] 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by forbidding Mr. 
Hall's attorneys and their agents from contacting jurors? [sic] 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. 
(Brief, p.5.) 
Hall's motion for a court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' 
investigator where the investigator could provide information 
relevant to his post-conviction claims but was unwilling to 
voluntarily provide an affidavit? [sic] 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Because Hall failed to establish Elam' s deposition was necessary to protect Hall's 
substantial rights and because he was permitted to depose both of his trial 
attorneys, has he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to depose Elam? 
2. Because Hall failed to establish ex parte and unbridled post-verdict interviews 
with the jurors and alternate jurors was relevant and necessary to any claim in his 
amended post-conviction petition, but rather were merely fishing expeditions to 
gather information to raise claims that were not even alleged in his amended 
petition, has he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by not 




Hall Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His Request To Depose Elam 
A. Introduction 
Hall contends, "[ u ]nder the circumstances of this case" his "requested discovery 
was mandatory" because he "provided a statement of claims in his petition to which Mr. 
Elam's testimony was relevant and necessary to establish the scope of the investigation 
conducted in relationship to these claims." (Brief, p.26.) Alternatively, Hall contends the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his request to depose Elam "because the 
Court's denial was based on misapplication of the relevant law and facts," based upon the 
contention that "trial counsel could not provide either a complete or accurate description 
of their investigation" thereby preventing Hall from "fully developing his claims" 
without Elam's deposition, and erroneously concluding Elam was "fully cooperative with 
Mr. Hall's investigation." (Brief, pp.26, 36.) 
Because he deposed his trial attorneys and he attempts to tie his request to depose 
Elam to a single claim and minor discrepancy in Carr's deposition, Hall has failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to depose Elam .. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Discovery in post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the discretion of 
the district court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. 
Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 319, 912 P.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996). When this Court 
reviews a ruling for abuse of discretion, it does so through a multi-tiered inquiry, 
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"examining 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 2009 WL 1835331, *1 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989». 
C. General Standards Of Law For Discovery In Post-Conviction Cases 
While post-conviction cases are civil in nature, State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548 (1983), the rules of discovery contained in Idaho's rules of civil 
procedure do not apply in post-conviction cases. I.C.R. 57(b). "When an applicant 
believes discovery is necessary for acquisition of evidence to support a claim for post-
conviction relief, the applicant must obtain authorization from the court to conduct 
discovery." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). 
"Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district 
court is not required to order discovery." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 
P.3d 924 (2001). In Raudebaugh, the petitioner made conclusory statements about what 
an expert and investigator might have testified to at trial but did not point to specific 
facts. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of discovery 
because "Raudebaugh' s allegations only argue what the experts might have testified to 
had trial counsel employed them. Raudebaugh's allegations are speculative." Id. 
In Aeschilman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
court denied post-conviction discovery because the applicant failed to "identify the type 
of information that he or she may obtain through discovery that could affect the 
disposition of his or her application for post-conviction relief." See also LePage v. State, 
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138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In order to be granted discovery, a 
post-conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is 
requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application"). 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Hall's Request To 
Depose Elam 
Initially, Hall raises a due process claim, contending he has a "constitutional right 
to meaningful post-conviction proceedings," which is "hollow if there is not a meaningful 
opportunity to develop a factual basis for all post-conviction claims." (Brief, p.27.) 
Hall's argument is nothing more than a derivative of an argument already rejected by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in Aeschilman, 132 Idaho at 402 - that Idaho's post-conviction 
discovery procedures allegedly violate due process. Because Hall has failed to even cite 
Aeschilman, let alone explain why it is distinguishable or should be overruled, his 
argument must be rejected. As explained by the court of appeals: 
[I]n contrast to ordinary civil litigation, the typical disincentives against 
unfettered discovery do not exist in the post-conviction arena. First, there 
is little if any financial disincentive from engaging in unlimited discovery, 
because an applicant for post-conviction relief is usually indigent and 
proceeds pro se or is appointed counsel. Thus unbridled discovery costs 
the applicant nothing and sanctions for discovery abuses are, for the most 
part, impractical. 
Id., at 401. 
The court of appeals' rationale is particularly true in capital cases because death-
sentenced inmates have every incentive to delay their cases through oppressive and 
unduly burdensome discovery that is designed to merely increase the costs of capital 
litigation. In fact, as a result of the incentive death-sentenced inmates have to "thwart 
their sentences," the Idaho Legislature enacted I.e. § 19-2719, which is designed to 
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"avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be 
consolidated in one proceeding .... ," which has been expressly affirmed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988). 
Relying upon the steady beat of "death is different," Hall also contends he should 
have been permitted to depose Elam based upon "heightened procedural safeguards" in 
capital cases. (Brief, p.37.) While the courts have applied such safeguards in limited 
situations, Hall has cited only one federal district court case, Payne v. Bell, 89 F.Supp.2d 
967, 971 (W.D. TelID. 2000), to support his contention. Of course, because Payne 
involves a discovery standard in federal habeas cases, it is inapposite. Moreover, the 
state is unaware of such a standard being used in any other federal habeas case. Rather, 
the federal standard permits the district court to order discovery "provided that the habeas 
petitioner presents specific allegations showing reason to believe that the facts, if fully 
developed, may lead to habeas relief." Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2001).1 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has never adopted a "death is different approach" to 
post conviction discovery issues. The Idaho Legislature has enacted legislation to 
expedite capital cases, not facilitate delay associated with unbridled discovery. See I.C. § 
1 The "good cause" standard for discovery in federal habeas has been modified as a result 
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). In Boyko v. Parke, 
259 F.3d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2001), the court recognized if a habeas petitioner engages 
in discovery and expansion of the record under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules Governing § 
2254 Cases "to achieve the same end as an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner ought to be 
subject to the same constraints that would be imposed if he had sought an evidentiary 
hearing." In Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1248-49 (11 th Cir. 2002), the court addressed 
the limitations on discovery that were imposed by the AEDP A, explaining, "Congress 
modified the discretion afforded to the district court and erected additional barriers 
limiting a habeas petitioner's right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing." 
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19-2719. Moreover, in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291,17 P.3d 230 (2000), the Idaho 
Supreme Court expressly applied LC.R. 57 to a capital case, explaining: 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put 
to the sound discretion of the district court. LC.R. 57(b). The discovery 
provisions in the civil rules, which generally apply to proceedings on an 
application for post-conviction relief, are not applicable unless so ordered 
by the district court. Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (Ct. 
App. 1992). There is no requirement that the district court order 
discovery, unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's 
substantial rights. Id. 
Hall's principle argument centers on his contention that the district court's denial 
of Elam's deposition constituted an abuse of discretion because it was necessary to 
protect his "substantial rights" where he allegedly identified claims that Elam's 
deposition would support and the type of information he would obtain from Elam in 
support of those claims. (Brief, pp.27-37.) However, the only claim upon which Hall 
now relies is an allegation that "trial counsel failed to investigate an alternate perpetrator 
or co-perpetrator defense"; presumably an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Brief, pp.27-28.) But the portion of the 
amended petition upon which Hall relies - claim D-7 - involves a claim that the state 
allegedly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), by failing to disclose favorable evidence regarding a "potential alternate 
perpetrator," not a failure to investigate by his attorneys or Elam. (Brief, pp.27-29 (citing 
UPCPA, R., pp.l90-92).) Hall's attempt to now change the claim from a Brady violation 
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to support his request to depose Elam cannot 
be countenanced by this Court and demonstrates his true purpose in deposing Elam was 
to embark on a fishing expedition to raise new claims for his final amended petition, 
which was filed October 5, 2007. (UPCPA, R., pp.1053-1350.) 
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Moreover, even if Hall had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, both 
in his amended petition and on appeal as a basis for deposing Elam, the argument fails 
because Hall had already deposed Myshin and Carr. (UPCP A, exhibit 15 containing 
exhibits 13-16 of Hall's Final Amended Petition.) Myshin explained the defense 
investigated the "alternate perpetrator" theory involving Patrick Hoffert ("Hoffert"): 
Q. So maybe there's another person, possibly? 
A. All the DNA shows that they had sex. Well, we had 
Christian Johnson. I mean, that was obvious. We had the 13th Alelle, 
which was obvious. So there was some information that we had, even 
before the trial, that there was somebody else involved. Then towards the 
end we had that guy Pat what's-his-face. 
Q. Hoffert? 
A. Yeah. We knew about that and looked into that. So that 
was a possibility, although it turned out there wasn't much there. 
Q. Can you tell me what your investigation revealed on 
Patrick Hoffert? 
A. Yes. We got a police report late in the case from I think 
Smith, Dave Smith. And it gave us the names of these people. And so we 
had Glen -- or I had Glen go out and talk to them. 
(UPCPA, exhibit 15 containing exhibit 13, pp.68-69.) 
Not only did Myshin discuss his recollection of asking Elam to investigate the 
alternate perpetrator theory, but he identified a note dated August 9, in which he was 
"asking Glen to interview Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis, amongst other individuals," which 
apparently involved information regarding Hoffert. (Id., pp.70-71.) Myshin "assumed" 
Elam interviewed Peggy Hill ("Hill") and Lisa Lewis ("Lewis"), which revealed 
information "pretty much along the lines of the police report, that there wasn't anything 
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else." (ld., pp.73-74.) Finally, when asked if Elam would be able to give more "detail 
about those interviews," Myshin explained, "Probably not." (Id., p.74.) 
Carr confirmed Elam conducted an investigation regarding Hoffert, although it 
was his "belief' that he "heard" about Hoffert's statement - that he allegedly raped the 
girl - after his representation of Hall was completed. (UPCP A, exhibit 15 containing 
exhibit 15, pp.217-20.) Carr also confirmed that the alternate perpetrator theory, with 
Hoffert as the alternative perpetrator, was discussed prior to trial because the defense 
team "didn't like the idea of [Hall] being seen with Lynn Henneman right before she 
died" (id., pp.221-22), but the defense chose not to present such a theory "in order to 
keep out from the jury evidence that our client was actually seen with Lynn Henneman 
that night" (id., p.224). Carr later reaffirmed that Hoffert was investigated by E1am as a 
possible co-conspirator and that a strategic decision was made not to present such a 
defense because "it puts Erick at the scene. That was a problem." (UPCPA, exhibit 15 
containing exhibit 16, pp.320-22.) Moreover, Carr confirmed that if information that 
Hoffert had allegedly raped Lynn was known before trial the outcome would not have 
changed. (ld., pp.358-60.) In other words, the evidence would have also established Hall 
was seen with Lynn, which was "very concerning," "delicate" and "could be 
catastrophically bad for Erick Hall." (Id., pp.359-60.) 
Moreover, Hall conceded Elam was being cooperative with his attempts to 
investigate Myshin and Carr's "investigation." After deposing Myshin and Carr, Hall 
expressly stated, "I can state to the Court that Mr. Elam has been cooperative with our 
investigator, but has stated that he would not undergo deposition without court order." 
(UPCPA, Tr., 1-16-07, p.3!.) Therefore, when the district court concluded Elam was 
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being "cooperative" (id., p.35), it was based upon Hall's concession. In lieu of a 
deposition, Hall attempted to have Elam sign an affidavit, but Elam explained he required 
Myshin's consent before he could sign the affidavit. (UPCPA, Tr., 8-8-07, p.62.) While 
Hall attempted to obtain Myshin's consent, due to Myshin and Elam's "very busy 
[schedule] at the Ada County public defender's office, he had been unsuccessful"; there 
was no allegation that Myshin or Elam were trying to avoid giving or obtaining 
permission to sign an affidavit or otherwise be uncooperative. (Id., p.63.) Responding to 
Hall's motion, the prosecutor asserted the issue could be resolved without a deposition by 
having Hall's investigator, Michael Shaw ("Shaw"), supply an affidavit regarding the 
content of his conversations with Elam. (Id., p.63.) While Hall had concerns regarding 
the admissibility of Shaw's deposition, he agreed, "if the Court were to deny that [the 
deposition], in the alternative, then, we'd be willing to submit an affidavit for Mr. Shaw." 
(Id., pp.64-65.) The district court denied Hall's motion to depose Elam, but concluded, "I 
think the affidavit of Mr. Shaw may be an alternative." (Id., pp.65-66.) 
However, instead of providing Shaw's affidavit to support his amended or final 
post-conviction petition, Hall chose to file his Motion for Permission to Appeal (UPCP A, 
R., pp.996-1006) with Shaw's affidavit detailing his conversations with Elam, which 
included information that Elam interviewed Lewis on August 12, 2004, regarding Hoffert 
allegedly having "raped a girl" (UP CPA, exhibit 13, appendix II). 
Based upon the depositions of Myshin and Carr, coupled with Shaw's affidavit 
confirming Elam interviewed Lewis on August 12,2004, well before commencement of 
jury selection on September 29,2004, exactly how the district court abused its discretion 
in denying Hall's request to depose Elam regarding claim D(7), whether as a Brady or 
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Strickland claim, remains a mystery. Rather, it appears Hall's sole purpose in deposing 
Elam is to fish for new claims that are not a part of his amended or final post-conviction 
petitions, or simply increase the costs associated with his post-conviction case, 
particularly where he has agreed that Shaw's affidavit regarding his interviews with Elam 
was sufficient. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,108,967 P.2d 702 (1998) (affirming the 
district court's order denying a capital petitioner's request to depose the trial judge where 
there were alternative sources to obtain the same information). 
The state appreciates Hall's desire to have the district court circumvent Idaho's 
post-conviction discovery rules based upon American Bar Association ("ABA") 
guidelines or standards that have been adopted by authors of various treatises. (Brief, 
p.35.) However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court 
has concluded such standards are constitutionally mandated. The Supreme Court has 
expressly recognized such standards are merely 
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No 
particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counselor the 
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally 
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel 
must have in making tactical decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed 
guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding 
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
Recently, the Supreme Court examined ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and recognized, "the Constitution does not codify the ABA's Model Rules." 
Monteja v. Louisian!l, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009). Moreover, referring to 
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
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Cases (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court has declined the "invitation to adopt these 
guidelines." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782, 948 P.2d 127 (1997). 
Finally, Hall takes issue with the district court's concern that ordering 
unnecessary and unwarranted depositions of support staff, including defense 
investigators, could result in fewer competent defense attorneys to defend capital 
murderers and contends, "the district court's decision was not consistent with applicable 
legal standards or a sound factual analysis." (Brief, pp.36-37 (quoting UPCPA, Tr., 11-
15-07, pp.18-19.) However, the district court's concern has been raised by the Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Addressing whether it is appropriate to 
address only the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance claims, the Supreme Court 
explained, "Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so 
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result." 
Strickland 466 U.S. at 697. This problem has not been lost on the Ninth Circuit, which 
explained, "An unfortunate offshoot of death penalty litigation has been the recurrent 
demonization of prior counsel - no doubt sometimes justly, but sometimes not - through 
the inevitable filing of Strickland claims. Death penalty counsel, whether trial or 
appellate, face the most demanding challenges the profession has to offer." Williams v. 
Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). Clearly, the district court's concern 
was not unwarranted or inconsistent with applicable legal standards. 
Rather than requesting discovery that was necessary to protect his substantial 
rights, Hall's request to depose Elam constitutes a fishing expedition, which is simply not 
permitted because post-conviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or 
retesting of physical evidence introduced at the criminal trial." Murphy, 143 Idaho at 
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148. Moreover, "[t]he scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for post-
conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal." Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 
932 P.2d 348 (1997). As explained in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983), "it 
must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction 
or sentence." While Barefoot involves the role of federal habeas in state convictions, as 
explained in Mumhy, 143 Idaho at 148, the same is true for state post-conviction. Like 
federal habeas, post-conviction proceedings are "secondary and limited. . .. not forums 
in which to relitigate state trials." Barefoot, 463 at 887. 
Because the district court correctly perceived the issue of granting Hall's motion 
to depose Elam as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion 
consistent with applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason, Hall has failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his request to depose Elam. 
II. 
Hall Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His Motion For Unlimited And Unsupervised Interviews With 
The Jury After He Had Been Found Guilty And Sentenced To Death 
A. Introduction 
Hall initially contends the district court's order "imposed a prior restraint in 
violation of First Amendment, impeded [his] post-conviction investigation in violation of 
[due process], and eliminated an important procedural safeguard against the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 
(Brief, p.6.) Assuming arguendo the district court had authority to deny his motion for 
unlimited and unsupervised interviews with jurors (Brief, pp.20-2l), Hall next contends 
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the district court erred by adopting a "discovery standard for juror contact," "exceeded its 
authority" because there was no evidence establishing his attorneys or agents conunitted 
misconduct, and "violated Idaho law by effectively interpreting I.R.E. 606(b) in a marmer 
not supported by existing law, and by creating a new rule" that impeded his "rights to 
conduct an independent and thorough post-conviction investigation." (Brief, pp.24-25.) 
Hall's First Amendment and due process arguments have been universally 
rejected by other jurisdictions, and he has failed to establish his "death is different" 
argument warrants reversal of the district court's order. Because the district court had 
inherent authority to regulate contact with jurors and the order from which he appeals is 
from the denial of nothing more than a discovery motion, Hall has failed to establish the 
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to contact jurors when his motion was 
merely a fishing expedition searching for claims that had no factual support. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Hall is appealing only from the district court's order denying his Motion 
for Juror Contact, which is nothing more than an "investigative aid," the district court's 
order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Row v. State, 131 Idaho 303,310-11,955 
P.2d 1082 (1998); see also Anderson v. State, --- S.3d -"-, 2009 WL 1954982, *14 (Fla. 
2009) ("A trial court's decision on a motion to interview jurors is reviewed pursuant to an 
abuse of discretion standard"). 
18 
C. Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Order Violates The 
Constitution 
I. The District Court's Order Does Not Violate The First Amendment 
Hall correctly notes, "The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative 
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the 
time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
550 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). However, 
whether the district court's denial of Hall's motion constitutes a "prior restraint" is 
debatable since judges regularly enter orders prohibiting litigants from various forms of 
communication and Hall has failed to cite any case in which the Supreme Court's "prior 
restraint" doctrine was applied to an order denying a motion to contact jurors after entry 
of the judgment. There is not even universal acceptance of the "prior restraint" doctrine 
in the context of news gathering by the media. See State v. Montana Twenty-First 
Judicial Dist. Ct., 933 P.2d 829, 838-39 (Mont. 1997) (discussing the "considerable 
disagreement as to whether participant gag orders are prior restraints on the media"). 
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has agreed "with the majority of the States 
that the 'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' standard constitutes a 
constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in 
pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials," Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 
U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991), the Court has not adopted the four-step analysis contended by 
Hall (Brief, p.8), nor has the standard been applied by the Court in cases that are not 
"pending," i.e., cases in which the defendant has already been convicted and sentenced. 
Rather, Gentile involved an attorney who made public statements hours after his client 
was indicted in violation of Nevada's rules governing attorney conduct, and the Court 
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repeatedly emphasized the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard was 
being applied in the context of an attorney representing a defendant prior to and during 
criminal proceedings. See Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 
425,431 (Tex. 1998) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Gentile focused on the lawyers' 
public comments about pending cases in which they are involved, and expressly declined 
to decide whether a higher standard applies to the speech of lawyers who are strangers to 
the litigation"). Because the court in Benton concluded, "If the lawyer tries to continue 
exerting his influence over the jurors after they have completed their service, he cannot 
plausibly claim that he is doing so as an ordinary citizen," therefore, under the rationale 
of Gentile, the court concluded the "likelihood of material prejudice" standard "is 
sufficient protection for attorneys' speech in this context," id., but concluded the 
attorney's letter did not violate the First Amendment under that standard, id., at 432. 
While Idaho has not addressed the question of whether an order prohibiting post-
verdict juror interviews violates the First Amendment, other jurisdictions have rejected 
such challenges. In Haeberle v. Texas Int'I Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984), 
the district court denied one of the parties' attorney leave to learn "some lesson" about 
the basis for the jury's verdict, which was adverse to his client. While the Fifth Circuit 
recognized "[wJeighty first amendment interests may be harmed by inhibiting the flow of 
information from jurors to the public," "[tJhe petitioners' access to information from 
jurors carries far less weight in the first amendment scale than a restriction on access to 
information that affects political behavior." Id. at 1021-22. The court also explained, 
"The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect its processes 
from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the 
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accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of 
the court should be permitted to frustrate its purpose." Id., at 2022. Rejecting the First 
Amendment argument, the court concluded, "We agree with the district court's implicit 
conclusion that those interests are not merely balanced but plainly outweighed by the 
jurors' interest in privacy and the public's interest in well-administered justice." Id. 
Likewise, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (loth Cir. 
1986), the court recognized the necessity of "distinguish[ing] cases discussing contact 
with jurors by news media from cases dealing with contact by parties or the attorneys that 
took part in the trial," and explained, "[t]he media has less incentive to upset a verdict 
than does a losing party or attorney. Thus, while a court may broadly proscribe attorney 
and party contact with former jurors, it does not have the same freedom to restrict press 
interviews with former jurors." 
In Gagliano v. Ford Motor Co., 551 F.Supp. 1077 (D. Kansas 1982), the court 
rejected a First Amendment claim challenging a local rule that limited attorneys' ability 
to interview jurors after a verdict had been rendered. The court explained: 
The rule protects jurors from harassment, decreases changes and 
temptations for tampering, and promotes the finality of verdicts. The 
service of a juror to the court is the cornerstone of our judicial system, and 
competent jurors who are willing to serve are at a premium. An 
unrestricted fishing expedition, such as that contemplated by plaintiff, 
would make it seriously difficult to convince such jurors to serve. 
Id. at 1079; see also United States v. Cleveland, 1997 WL 412466, *1 n.2 (E.D. La. 
1997) (" There is no question that the Court's order restricting the parties and their 
lawyers from contacting the jurors is constitutional"); United States v. Sokoloff, 696 
F.Supp. 1451, 1457-58 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (relying upon policies articulated in Tanner v. 
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United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), and F.R.E. 606(b) in rejecting the contention that a 
rule preventing an attorney from interviewing jurors violates the First Amendment). 
State jurisdictions have also rejected First Amendment arguments involving an 
attorney's post-verdict interview with jurors. In Benton,. 980 S.W.2d at 432, the court 
recognized, "it is well established in the law that post-verdict speech can also pose a 
significant threat to the fairness of jury trials to justify curtailing the would-be speakers' 
constitutional interests." Relying in part upon Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1022, and Tarmer, 
483 U.S. at 120-21, the Texas court recognized, "Courts have used the same reasoning to 
uphold restrictions on post-verdict questioning of jurors against a variety of constitutional 
challenges by criminal defendants and civil litigants." Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 432. 
"[T]hese and related cases specifically recognize that the state's interest in protecting the 
jury system includes preventing post-verdict juror harassment." Id., at 432-33. Finally, 
the court concluded, "If post-verdict interviews are permitted, the cases reason, that fact 
will become common knowledge among jurors, and the anticipation of such interviews 
will affect jurors' behavior in deliberations." Id. at 433. 
These general principles have also been applied in capital cases. For example, in 
State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d I, 96-97 (N.J. 1997), the coilli focused upon "sound reasons 
of policy, including the prevention of juror harassment and the avoidance of chilling jury 
deliberations" and expressly recognized the practice of requiring some showing of 
extraneous influence before permitting a party to interview jurors "is particularly 
appropriate when the jury has already been discharged." In rejecting the First 
Amendment argument, the court explained, "The compelling public interest in protecting 
jurors and their deliberations amply justifies the restriction on contacting them without 
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good cause." rd., at 97; see also State v. Loftin, 670 S.2d 557, 573-74 (N.J. 1996) (citing 
cases rejecting First Amendment challenges to rules limiting an attorney's ability to 
interview jurors); State v. Cabrera, 2008 WL 3853992, *20-22 (Del. 2008) (unpublished). 
Presuming the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard applies and 
relying upon Gentile, supra, Hall contends the district court's order targeted "all 
communications Mr. Hall's attorneys might have with jurors, without regard for whether 
the communications" meet the presumed standard. (Brief, p.l2.) Hall's reliance upon 
Gentile is misplaced; the Court did not conclude the attorney's pre-trial statements were 
protected speech. Rather, five Justices concluded Nevada's rule did not violate the First 
Amendment. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court 
with respect to the First Amendment claim, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia 
and Souter joined. rd., at 1032. Gentile was reversed based upon a void for vagueness 
challenge addressed by Justice Kennedy in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens 
and O'Conner joined. rd. On this basis alone, Hall's argument fails. Moreover, Gentile 
actually supports the state's position because after merely reviewing the policies behind 
the regulation of lawyers' speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "The restraint on 
speech is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives." rd. at 1075-76. 
The district court recognized the policies associated with limiting post-verdict 
interviews and, after Hall refused the state's offer to have the jurors interviewed under 
court supervision, properly denied Hall's motion. The question was not whether Hall's 
attorneys acted "unprofessionally if left to their own devices" (Brief, p.l2), but the 
policies associated with preventing post-verdict juror interviews as articulated above. 
23 
For these same reasons, Hall's contention that the district court's order was not 
narrowly tailored because it "failed to consider any reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions" (Brief, pp.16-17) also fails. Hall expressly rejected the state's offer to more 
narrowly tailor the court's order by having the jurors examined under court supervision 
because "[tJhere are so many psychological reasons for not doing that. And there's no 
support in law. Again, there's nothing prohibiting us from contacting these people." 
(UP CPA, Tf., 8-8-07, p.l21.) Not only did Hall fail to provide any evidence supporting 
his claim that there are "psychological reasons for not doing that," but he clearly wanted 
all or nothing. In other words, if he could not have unbridled and unsupervised 
interviews with the jurors, he wanted no interviews. Hall is now barred from 
complaining that the district court's order was not narrowly tailored. 
2. The District Court's Order Does Not Violate Due Process 
Contending he has a due process right to "meaningful post-conviction 
proceedings," Hall contends the district court's order violated his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. (Brief, pp.8, 18.) Assuming arguendo that Hall 
actually has a due process right to conduct post -conviction proceedings, he has failed to 
establish the district court's order violated that right. 
The state recognizes Hall's attorneys have a duty to conduct an investigation 
during post-conviction proceedings. However, as explained in section I(D) above, that 
duty is not dictated by the ABA nor does it permit an unfettered and unbridled 
investigation that allows for fishing expeditions. See Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148 (post-
conviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or retesting of physical 
evidence introduced at the criminal trial"). Rather, a "direct appeal is the primary avenue 
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for review of a conviction or sentence." Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 887; see also Rodgers, 129 
Idaho at 725 ("The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for post-
conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal"). 
As explained in MalDonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770 
(5th Cir. 1986), "The defendant's right to a fair trial is not absolute; it may be outweighed 
by other considerations, including the jury's right to privacy and protection from 
harassment." Based upon the considerations of a juror's right to privacy and protection 
from harassment, the courts have uniformly rejected claims that restrictions on 
interviewing jurors violate due process. See e.g., Xiong v. Felker, 2009 WL 1438979, 
*8-10 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Floyd v. State, --- So.3d ---, 2009 WL 1544273, *21 (Fla. 2009); 
Israel v. State, 985 So.2d 510, 522-23 (Fla. 2008) (citing Johnson v. State, 804 So.2d 
1218, 1224-25 (Fla. 2001»; In re Bowling, 2005 WL 924323, *3 (Ky. 2005) 
(unpublished); State v. Harris, 859 A.2d 364, 434 (N.J. 2004) (citing State v. Loftin, 680 
A.2d 677, 720 (N.J. 1996». 
3. The District Court's Order Does Not Violate The Eighth Amendment 
When every other argument fails, capital litigants, like Hall, fall back to perennial 
"death is different" argument. (Brief, p.19.) As explained in section I(D) above, while 
the courts have applied such safeguards in limited situations, Hall has failed to cite a 
single case in which the Eighth Amendment has been used to salvage a claim involving 
post-verdict interviews with jurors during post-conviction proceedings. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has never adopted a "death is different approach" to post conviction 
discovery issues. As explained above, the Idaho Legislature enacted legislation to 
expedite capital cases, not facilitate delay associated with unbridled discovery. See also 
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Fields, 135 Idaho at 286 (applying Idaho's post-conviction discovery rule, LC.R. 57, to a 
capital case). As repeatedly discussed, Hall's motion to conduct post-verdict juror 
interviews was nothing more than a fishing expedition, which has never been tolerated by 
any court. Finally, as detailed throughout section II, restrictions on post-verdict juror 
interviews have been regularly and consistently upheld in capital cases without applying 
additional safeguards that have been required in a limited number of capital issues. 
D. Absent Rule Or Statutorv Authority, The District Court Had Inherent Authority 
To Prohibit Unfettered Contact With The Jurors 
Presumably, Hall assumed the district court had inherent authority because he was 
unable to find any case stating a judge does not have inherent authority to limit juror 
contact after the jury's service has been completed. In Townsel v. Superior Court, 979 
P.2d 963, 967 (CaL 1999), the court recognized, "Despite the absence of any affirmative 
statutory power, trial courts exercised their inherent powers to ensure jurors were 
protected, following their discharge from a trial, from threats to their physical safety and 
invasions of their personal privacy." The court explained, "we [have] found the trial 
court had the inherent power to impose the limitation, explaining that' [a] trial court has 
inherent as well as statutory discretion to control the proceedings to ensure the 
efficacious administration of justice' and that, in exercising such discretion the trial court 
may deny to the losing party in a legal proceeding 'unqualified access to the jury after the 
conclusion of the triaL'" Id., at 968 (quoting People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 401 (Cal. 
1991)). The courts' inherent authority is premised upon '''strong public policies [that] 
protect discharged jurors from improper[] intrusive conduct in all cases, ", which 
constitutes "a substantial threat to the administration of justice" when it remains 
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uncontrolled. Id., at 967 (quoting In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d 600, 629 n.23 (Cal. 1999»; 
see also Crider v. State, 29 P.3d 577, 578 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (If a juror reports 
harassment, the trial court has the inherent authority to issue a protective order, upon 
application and for cause, prohibiting a named person or persons from having further 
contact with that juror"). 
The federal courts are in agreement. As explained in Miller v. United States, 403 
F .2d 77, 81-82 (2nd Cir. 1968), "we see no basis for doubting the authority of the trial 
judge to direct that any interrogation of jurors after the conviction shall be under his 
supervision." While the court recognized the questioning of jurors after conviction "is 
indeed appropriate for court rule, the absence of one does not deprive a judge of power to 
act in an individual case." Id., at 82; see also United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 665 
(2nd Cir. 1978) ("in order to insure that jurors are protected from harassment, a district 
judge has the power, and sometimes the duty, to order that post-trial investigation of 
jurors shall be under his supervision"). 
While Idaho has not expressly addressed the question of whether courts have 
inherent authority to restrict juror contact after a verdict has been entered, the Idaho 
Supreme Court recently addressed the question of inherent authority in In re Facilities 
and Equipment Provided by City of Boise, --- Idaho ---, --- P.3d ---, 2009 WL 2594878, 
*7 (2009). Relying in part upon I.C. § 1-1622, which codifies the court's inherent 
authority, the court concluded, "Courts have the inherent power to grant intervention to 
persons who may be adversely affected by the outcome of a proceeding or when 
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equitable principles otherwise require.,,2 Id. Certainly, allowing the courts to protect 
jurors from being harassed by the unwarranted invasion of their right to privacy "is in 
accordance with the spirit of the Idaho Code." Id. 
The court's inherent authority to protect jurors is exemplified in Idaho Criminal 
Jury Instruction ("ICJI") 232, which reads as follows: 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are 
discharged with the sincere thanks of this Court. The question may arise 
as to whether you may discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone 
else. For your guidance, the Court instructs you that whether you talk to 
the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper 
for you to discuss this case, if you wish to, but you are not required to do 
so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you 
choose to, you may tell them as much or as little as you like, but you 
should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your fellow jurors. 
Remember that they understood their deliberations to be confidential. 
Therefore, you should limit your comments to your own perceptions and 
feelings. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, 
or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any 
discussion has begun, please report to me. 
(Emphasis added). 
If the courts have inherent authority to guard against harassment of jurors post-
verdict when so advised by a juror, certainly the courts have the same authority to guard 
against harassment even if not so advised by a juror. If that authority does not exist and 
courts cannot intervene when requested by a juror, the implied promise of intervention 
from ICJI 232 is indeed hollow and should no longer be given by judges. 
2 Idaho Code § 1-1622 reads as follows, "When jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any 
other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means necessary to carry it 
into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of 
proceedings be not specifically pointed out by this code, or the statute, any suitable 
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted, which may appear most conformable to 
the spirit of this code." 
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E. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Hall's Motion For 
Juror Contact 
While Hall notes the district court's discussion on January 6, 2006, during an 
informal telephone conference regarding contact with the jurors, and the resulting 
motions, hearings, and rulings that stemmed from that conference (Brief, pp.20-22), the 
only issue before this Court is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his June 1, 2007 Motion for Juror Contact. While the proceedings, motions, hearings and 
rulings prior to that motion provide interesting and important background, the time to 
challenge any prior rulings in the context of an interlocutory appeal has long since 
expired. See I.A.R. 12(c)(1). Therefore, Hall's contention that he "did not ask the court 
to order jury interviews through discovery or otherwise facilitate his contact with jurors" 
(Brief, p.25) is untrue. Based upon the district court's orders prior to June 1, 2007, which 
Hall has not appealed, that is exactly what he did by filing his Motion for Juror Contact. 
Therefore, the standards detailed in section I(C) above apply to Hall's Motion for Juror 
Contact, and mandate a showing that the interviews were required to protect his 
"substantial rights." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605. 
Hall next contends the district court exceeded its authority because there was no 
"evidence his attorneys or their agents committed (or intended to commit) misconduct." 
(Brief, p.25.) While the state concedes there was no evidence establishing Hall's 
attorneys or agents were involved in or intended to commit misconduct, as previously 
explained, that is not the standard. Rather, "courts have routinely shielded jurors from 
post-trial 'fishing expeditions' carried out by losing attorneys interested in casting doubt 
on the jury's verdict." Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233,1236 (loth Cir. 
1986) (citing cases). As detailed above, "the courts have properly exercised their right to 
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protect jurors from unwanted post-trial harassment" and "upheld the denial of a motion 
by a losing attorney to interview jurors because that attorney's assertion of jury 
misconduct was unsubstantiated." Id. 
For example, in Anderson, 2009 WL 1954982, * 14, five years after his trial, the 
defendant moved to interview jurors to ascertain whether any of the jurors saw that he 
was shackled during his trial. Affirming the trial court's rejection of the motion, the 
Florida Supreme Court explained: 
Because there is no indication in the record that any of the shackles 
were perceptible to any members of the jury, we agree with the circuit 
court's decision and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion. To have granted the motion would have allowed 
Anderson to conduct a "fishing expedition" interview of the jurors, a 
practice which we have previously rejected. 
Florida is not the only jurisdiction that bars post-verdict interviews absent some 
specific evidence of misconduct. In Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1021, the Fifth Circuit 
discussed the federal courts' position on post-verdict juror interviews, which does not 
have a specific statute or rule prohibiting such interviews, as follows: 
Federal cOUlis have generally disfavored post-verdict interviewing 
of jurors. We have repeatedly refused to denigrate jury. trials by 
afterwards ransacking the jurors in search of some new ground not 
previously supported by evidence, for a new trial. Prohibiting post-verdict 
interviews protects the jury from an effort to find grounds for post-verdict 
charges of misconduct, reduces the "chances and temptations" for 
tampering with the jury, increases the certainty of civil trials and spares 
the districts courts time-consUll1ing and futile proceedings. We have 
therefore uniformly refused to upset the denial of leave to interview jurors 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the .. deliberations 
unless specific evidence of misconduct was shown by testimony or 
affidavit. 
Id. (citing cases). 
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In United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988), the court 
reiterated, "Requests to impeach jury verdicts by post-trial contact with jurors are 
disfavored." Because the defendaut "made no threshold showing of improper outside 
influence," the Fourth Circuit determined the trial court's denial of the request for post-
verdict interviews was not au abuse of discretion aud without such showing of improper 
outside influence, "defendant's request is a mere fishing expedition." Id. 
Reviewing "sound policy reasons for insulating a jury's deliberative process from 
public scrutiny in order to ensure finality in the verdict, as well as to maintain public 
confidence in the jury system," which were explained in Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118-19, the 
court in Sokoloff, concluded, "post-verdict juror interviews based on such wholly 
unreliable 'evidence' fundamentally undermines the larger policy considerations 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Tanner." 696 F.Supp.1451, 1455-56. 
Recognizing the "Iong-stauding common-law rule against inquiring into jurors' 
motives to impeach their verdict," which was discussed in Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, in a capital case, explained, "For sound reasons of policy, 
including the prevention of juror harassment aud the avoidauce of chilling jury 
deliberations, courts typically require some showing of extraueous influence before 
permitting a party to interview jurors. [Cases omitted]. That practice is particularly 
appropriate when the jury has already been discharged." Marshall, 690 A.2d at 280. 
In Townsel, 979 P.2d at 965, a case remarkably similar to Hall's, the trial court 
entered a sua sponte order that "there's to be no jury contact without prior court approval. 
In other words, if you do come upbn a juror questionnaire that you do waut to contact that 
person, then you'll have to petition the Court, giving forth your reasons before that would 
31 
be granted." When asked the reason for the order, the court replied, "r just think it's only 
fair that jurors not be contacted unless there's some cause, not to go out and disturb them 
on a fishing expedition." rd. Like other courts, the California Supreme Court recognized 
that "'strong public policies protect discharged jurors from improperly intrusive conduct 
in all cases,'" which include, "a juror's state constitutional right to privacy; the possible 
deterrence of prospective jurors from fulfilling their obligation to serve if they knew they 
would be subject to postverdict intrusions into their lives; reducing incentives for jury 
tampering; promoting free and open discussion among jurors in deliberations; and 
protecting the finality of verdicts." rd. at 968. Although recognizing this was a capital 
case, the court noted the period of time since the jury had completed its service and 
ultimately concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellate 
counsel approach jurors through the court, which permitted the court to "act as a neutral 
third party, serving to apprise the jurors of counsel's interest and to determine, in the first 
instance, if a juror will consent to an interview." rd. at 97l. 
Even a cursory review of Hall's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Juror 
Contact and the "anticipated questioning of jurors" (UPCPA, exhibit 12) reveals his 
motion was merely a fishing expedition. For example, Hall contended "[s]everal critical 
State witnesses were not disclosed on the juror questionnaire or during voir dire" and "[i]t 
is imperative that counsel inquire into the jurors [sic] knowledge of and relationship to 
the undisclosed witnesses." (rd., pp.13-14.) However, even if a juror had "knowledge of 
and relationship to an undisclosed witness," Hall completely failed to explain how such a 
finding was related to his amended petition or that he would otherwise be entitled to post-
conviction relief. As explained in Anderson, 2009 WL 1954982, *14, Hall's request to 
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inquire of jurors regarding an "awareness" of his wearing shackles (UPCP A, exhibit 12, 
p.14) was merely a fishing expedition; he provided no information "that any of the 
shackles were perceptible to any members of the jury," but merely based his request upon 
speculation. Hall provided no evidence that during voir dire or in their juror 
questionnaires any juror "failed to disclose material information, but merely noted a case 
that apparently discusses actual bias if a juror "lies concerning his background on juror 
questionnaire and during voir dire." (Id., p.14.) Likewise, Hall provided absolutely no 
information that any juror "conducted experiments, visited the crime scene, or otherwise 
considered extra record evidence" or was "influenced by non-jurors or other extraneous 
evidence." (Id., p.l5.) Moreover, these types of requests are a direct attempt to question 
jurors regarding deliberations, clearly prohibited by the policies underlying LR.E. 606(b). 
In fact, the entirety of Hall's "general inquiries" (id., pp.l3-18) are nothing more than a 
fishing expedition which will lead to the harassment and intimidation of jurors who 
honorably completed their jury service. This type of behavior was properly rejected by 
the district court and cannot be countenanced by this Court. 
Hall's "inquiries specific to certain jurors" are just as offensive. (UPCP A, exhibit 
12, pp.18-28.) For example, Hall wishes to question juror Linda Ostolasa regarding a 
statement she made during voir dire and whether "personal constraints impacted the time 
taken to deliberate at sentencing" (id., p.18), a clear attack against the deliberative 
process and a personal attack regarding Ostolasa's deliberative process without any 
evidence to support the allegation. Likewise, despite being questioned during voir dire 
regarding her use of the Greenbelt, Hall desires to question juror Betty Mitchell as to 
"whether the juror's extensive use of the Greenbelt affected her views of the crime or Mr. 
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Hall" (id., p.19), another attack against the deliberative process and personal attack 
regarding whether Mitchell followed the district court's jury instructions. Most of Hall's 
"specific" questions are linked with questions raised during voir dire. However, voir dire 
is nearly always a tactical decision that cannot be impugned. See Mitchell v. State, 132 
Idaho 274, 279, 971 P.2d 727 (1998); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892,910 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901,906 (9th Cir. 1980» ("The conduct of 
voir dire 'will in most instances involve the exercise of a judgment which should be left 
to competent defense counsel'''). Without some factual basis for making these 
allegations, Hall's attacks against the deliberative process and specific jurors is 
unwarranted and prohibited by the policies associated with LR.E. 606(b). 
Finally, Hall contends the district court misinterpreted LR.E. 606(b) (Brief, p.25), 
which reads as follows: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course 
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or 
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in connection therewith, nor maya juror's affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a 
juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may 
be questioned about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or 
not the jury determined any issue by resort to chance. 
Hall's contention regarding I.R.E. 606(b) is misplaced because the district court 
did not rely upon the actual rule to deny his motion, but the underlying policies that 
support the rule. As explained in Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 197 
n.3, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003), the policy goals of LR.E. 606(b) include, "to promote finality, 
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protect jurors from post-trial inquiry or harassment, and to avoid the practical concern 
that an affidavit by a juror to impeach the verdict is potentially unreliable." 
Obviously, the policy goals of I.R.E. 606(b) and those associated with limiting 
post-verdict juror interviews are similar if not identical. Therefore, the district court's 
reliance upon l.R.E. 606(b), particularly the policy goals surrounding the rule, is 
supported by existing law, did not create a new rule abridging Hall's rights, or impede his 
right to conduct a post-conviction investigation. Rather, it was Hall's complete failure to 
demonstrate any basis, let alone "good cause" or the denial of his substantive rights that 
resulted in the district court's decision to deny his motion to interview jurors. Because 
Hall failed to demonstrate any basis for those interviews, he has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's interlocutory orders, 
including (1) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioner's Supplemental 
Motion for Discovery and (2) Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Juror 
Contact, be affirmed on appeal. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2009. 
1. LaMONT ANDER 
Deputy Attorney Ge eral 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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